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Words #1 
 How can a critique be formulated when its material conditions are the 
object of critique? One can criticize one’s state, to be sure; its violence, its wars. 
But how can one question the legitimacy of their own home; how can one point to 
the wrongs that are embedded into the very nature of their political existence? 
What would it mean for a Jewish Israeli not simply to write against “the 
occupation,” but to recognize that her home is historically conditioned upon the 
destruction of Palestinians’ homes; that her attachment to this place is founded 
upon a history—not such a distant history—of violence and is conditioned, at 
least to some extent, on the perpetuation of this violence? (And since Israel has 
become a paradigm of a certain kind of leftist critique, it is worth noting that the 
only difference between Israel and other settler colonies such as the United 
States or Australia is temporal density). Once we move to engage in such a 
critique there is no more separation between the “I” who writes and her object of 
critique, that is, the state and its doings (military and police violence, planning 
policy, legal discrimination). The I itself becomes the object of critique and her 
voice—the place from which she speaks, her language, the dialogues available for 
her—can no longer pretend to assume a position which is simply and clearly 
oppositional to injustice.    
 In my current attempt to envision an alternative reality in which both 
homes—those of Jews and those of Palestinians—can coexist, I suddenly find 
myself falling into vocabularies that sometimes seem to me strangely 
conservative. Perhaps such visions can be voiced only by the colonized? Is any 
effort to unfold them by the colonizers always another form of taking someone 
else’s place? Should we, Israeli Jews writing critically about Israel/Palestine, 
limit ourselves to a negative critique without trying to sketch ways out—ways 
that are perhaps not ours to sketch? But then wouldn’t we become yet another 
“proof” to the claim that there is no solution? 
 
Words #2 
 (Therefore,) when I do write about the occupation I often write about 
Israeli violence and about the Israeli movements that oppose this violence. As 
Jewish Israelis, I sometimes think we should avoid writing about Palestinians. 
This often feels to me like a mode of occupation in and of itself. Their voices are 
not mine to represent. So I limit myself to writing about Israeli powers, public 
discourse, or resistance. But this limitation carries its own problems: it once 
again erases the voices of the occupied. Are we confined to this limbo, moving 
between erasure and occupation, thereby reproducing the logic of the Israeli 
regime? But at the same time, sitting in Tel Aviv and writing about other 
subjects so to bypass this limbo seems like a privilege. I therefore often think 
that instead of writing we should do something. 
 
Action   
 But what would it mean “to do something” within such parameters1? At 
least in some ways, all political actions are doomed to fail (even when they 
succeed beyond all expectations). Political action, as Hannah Arendt noted but as 
any activist knows from experience, always exceeds the intention of the doer, and 
is never predictable.2 Action is often interpellated by different power structures 
and materializes into consequences that undermine the activists’ goals. It has its 
own life that cannot be contained within pre-planned “intentions.” Two cases I 
examined in the past can be indicative here, if only as a very brief illustration. 
The first is that of Tali Fahima, a radical left activist who decided to protect with 
her bodily presence (as a human shield) Zacharia Zubeidi.  Zubeidi was the 
leader of Al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, a Palestinian military group which planned 
and executed several suicide attacks in Israel, and was considered by the Israeli 
army a legitimate target of assassination. Despite a mode of action that sought to 
demonstrate the possibility of co-existence between Israelis and Palestinians, 
Fahima’s story—and more accurately a fictive story, in which she took the role of 
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Zubeidi’s lover and a terrorist by this mere association—was taken rather to 
entrench racial anxieties in Israel. Working against both her actions and her 
words, Fahima’s story was publically re-written as a story of conservative gender 
roles, in which (presumed) sex with the enemy becomes (presumed) maternal 
monstrosity (giving birth to a terrorist-to be), that calls for reinstituting 
boundaries rather than questioning them.3  The second case is that of Anarchists 
against the Wall (AAtW)—a solidarity-based Israeli group demonstrating in 
collaboration with Palestinians against the separation wall. As in the case of 
Fahima, solidarity takes place here via the practice of human shielding. The 
Jewish activists serve as a buffer between Palestinians and Israeli violence in 
order to reduce this violence. However in time (and in fact, quite quickly) the 
Anarchists themselves became legitimate targets of violence. They failed in their 
effort to shield. Moreover, and perhaps not less importantly, this logic of 
shielding reproduces, in and of itself, the very division between valued and 
disposable lives that the act of solidarity seeks to challenge. Two radical failures, 
then.4 In both cases, we see the cooptation of leftist action into the mechanisms 
justifying the occupation, the manners by which a public reading of action can 
turn it against itself, the ways in which activism is taken to justify the very 
powers it opposes.  
This is not to dismiss political action or call for political passivism. Indeed, 
failure itself must be thought of also through its productive aspects. Thus, even 
the moment of the most radical failure can be seen also as a moment of action’s 
greatest success. For Arendt what is disclosed through action is a distinct 
humanness—a “who”—that is revealed in action’s very materialization in the 
world; in the cases above, and perhaps in all cases of activism, action no longer 
reveals the activist’s own unique “who,” but the power against which she acts.5 
Queer theory can provide some clarification. For Judith Butler, failed 
performances of gender stances expose an array of alternative potential identities 
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and subject positions beyond the heteronormative dichotomist order, and hence 
expose also the artificiality of this order.6 Failure is thus “the weapon of the 
weak,” in the words of Jack Halberstam, following James Scott: it pushes against 
the boundaries of the intelligible, the doable, the possible, and in that reveals the 
logic, as well as the limits, of the heteronormative order, challenging it thereby.7 
A similar structure can be identified in many other cases of activism. The failure 
to physically protect co-demonstrators in the case of AAtW, for example, exposes 
an inherent failure in citizenship, which is the failure of democratic order and 
hence the activist’s greatest success. It points to the breaches in the pretense of 
the democratic state to protect its own citizens while challenging its legitimacy to 
hurt its noncitizens. This failure thus exposes the duplicity at the foundation of 
Israel as a democracy: the idea of a “Jewish-Democratic” state is splintered here 
twice. First, democracy is made fragile when the state shoots its own citizens; 
and second, the Jewish privilege embedded in the state’s definition is fractured 
when the targets of shooting are Jewish.  In fact at this moment, the 
contradiction of the combination of “Jewish” and “democratic” is exposed, since in 
a way it demonstrates that once one becomes “too” democratic (in full solidarity 
with Palestinians) she ceases to be a Jew from the point of view of the regime and 
its violence. Being shot at, therefore, can be seen both as the pinnacle of 
solidarity (exposing one’s life to the danger inflicted upon an other) and the 
clearest manifestation of the activist’s claim regarding the nature of the regime. 
Failure and success thus become enmeshed.       
Focusing on failure is therefore not a claim against political action. It is rather an 
attempt to struggle with the limits of antioccupation action, as well as its 
potentiality. But could I not say the same about writing?   
 
Writing and its Outcomes 
 Many of us writing in Israel about the occupation have been trying to 
engage in the same practice of revealing the logic of the Israeli regime, 
questioning the rhetoric of democracy as a façade concealing—and by so doing, 
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sustaining—a reality of militarized violence and radically discriminatory powers. 
Much of our work, I believe, rested on the assumption that there is a certain 
mask that must be removed; not entirely and accurately a lie, but a thin layer of 
democracy Israel must maintain in order to justify—from both within and 
without—its doings. Accordingly, many of us sought to expose that which is 
under this thin layer. We assumed that without it Israel would be vulnerable to 
both growing international critique and domestic unrest. Many Israelis, we 
believed, see themselves as peace-seeking liberals. If we could thus demonstrate 
the mechanisms and logic of governance that tie together the democratic rule 
prevailing in Tel Aviv with the military rule in Hebron, and if we could show that 
Israel keeps undercutting any viable political solution, this, we believed, would 
necessary lead to the end of occupation. In a way, I think we have succeeded, at 
least to some degree, in establishing these claims. But it seems that our success 
in this goal of peeling off masks was also our greatest failure. Once the masks 
were removed, the space was not democratized—almost to the contrary: with this 
removal Israel has been undergoing deep antidemocratic processes.    
 Not so long ago the rhetoric of the two states solution—even if merely a 
rhetoric and never a guideline for official political action—rested on the 
assumption that a Jewish democratic state (if such a combination is indeed 
possible) requires a Jewish majority. However, recently, the reluctance to 
relinquish hold over the territories Israel occupied in 1967 as well as the 
legitimacy crisis in regard to 1948 (it is not accidental, I think, that Netanyahu 
suddenly demanded that the Palestinians “recognize” the “Jewish state”) have 
been translated into a gradual but persistent abandonment of the Israeli 
democratic project. More and more people in Israel, on both the right and the left, 
now say what was not long ago inconceivable: that Israel is not, or soon will not 
be, a democracy. More often than not, this is not asserted from a critical 
standpoint, but is rather proclaimed to argue that the state should annex the 
Palestinian territories without incorporating their residences into its citizenry. In 
other words, the justification mechanisms that sustained a democratic discourse 
by talking about  “peace process” and a “two states solution” in order to present 
the state of occupation as temporary, , are replaced by a more direct claim stating 
that the state of occupation should become the rule of Israeli sovereignty.8 
Alongside these processes, other nondemocratic enterprises become more and 
more widespread: from legislation against the Supreme Court to decreasing 
academic freedom and to political violence in the streets in time of war.  
 Is it possible that our writings have contributed to this process by pushing 
the logic of democracy to its limits? Can we see here an analogy (perhaps a 
reversed one) to the analysis of activism above?  
 
Writing #2 
 Beyond this mode of cooptation, wherein by revealing the undemocratic 
infrastructure of the regime we might have helped to weaken some of its 
democratic elements, there are other questions to be asked about the conditions 
of critical writing in Israel. First, akin to the notion of pinkwashing or 
greenwashing, the antioccupation Israeli research might function as a certain 
“academic washing.” In criticizing Israel, revealing its wrongdoing, showing its 
logic of control, we demonstrate Israel’s tolerance and democratic nature—an 
attribute that seems to be proven by the very fact we can write these critiques. 
Writing against Israel we function as a proof that Israel allows dissent even 
amidst an existential threat—an ongoing threat, of course, which is part of the 
very founding logic of Zionism (which means that there is always a crisis of 
existential nature and accordingly a critique always serves to prove the 
democratic nature of Israel). Like the Supreme Court, human rights 
organizations, or gay-friendly policies, Israeli needs us to prove it is, indeed, the 
only democracy in the Middle East. Yet like the Supreme Court or human rights 
organization (but interestingly enough unlike gay-friendly policies), this need is 
becoming more and more a matter of history. As part of the dedemocraticization 
processes in Israel to which I pointed above, it seems it is less and less important 
for Israel to manifest such tolerance. Thus, in recent years there is increasing 
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legislation against critique, growing censorship in the Israeli academy, and 
persecution of intellectual dissent by both students and management. Perhaps 
“academic washing” is no longer called for.  
Second, the question of BDS is rearticulated as a series of paradoxical demands 
or practices when applied to Israeli academia. Some of us support the boycott, 
but how should such a support—a serious, genuine support—look from within 
Israel? What happens when we publish, with our names and Israeli affiliation, in 
international journals? Can the distinction between an individual and an 
academic boycott make sense here (especially within an economic model wherein 
universities receive governmental funding according to the number of 
publications)? Should we therefore encourage international journals not to 
publish our papers? Do we not violate the boycott regularly when we apply to 
international grants, when we provide scholarships based on such grants to our 
students? But can we survive in today’s neoliberal academia without doing so? 
Can someone belong to Israeli academia and coherently support the boycott then? 
One can contend that the boycott is not addressed to us, that it is not ours to 
support or object, that at best, we can make efforts not to undermine it. But don’t 
we undermine it on a regular basis, especially when we try to be politically and 
ethically engaged?  We collaborate with Palestinian scholars, for example. But in 
that, don’t we put them in an impossible stance vis-à-vis the boycott? And what 
would the alternative be? Collaborating with the silencing of Palestinians in 
Israeli academy? We are back with the limbo with which I opened.  
 Political Grounds 
 My main inquiry here concerns the ground from which critique is made. 
Perhaps all political grounds are unstable, but at times I feel that the one from 
which we have tried to make our critique is particularly so. 
Four of us, all from Tel Aviv University, were sitting in a cab on the way to a 
seminar in the Van Leer Jerusalem Institute. At some point the taxi driver left 
the main road and took a different, more rapid route—road 443. This road goes 
through the West Bank and is one of the roads on which Palestinians who are not 
citizens of Israel are not allowed to drive. We all started moving uncomfortably in 
our seats. Under any other circumstance we would probably have said 
something; refusing to go on that road; taking the opportunity to have a political 
conversation with the driver. But our driver was a Palestinian from East 
Jerusalem. Who am I, I thought, to judge? And how would such a judgement 
look, anyway? Could I have asked my Palestinian driver, given the multilayered 
privileges at play, how it is possible that he takes a route that is part of the 
dispossession of and discrimination against his own people? None of us was able 
to say anything, to ask, to open up a conversation. Sometimes I think that part of 
what is at stake for left critique in Israel is to keep open more conversations—
which are getting increasingly impossible. But could there have been a 
conversation had it been a Jewish driver? We could have stood our grounds, for 
sure, insisted he take a different road, and we would have probably felt very good 
about ourselves—very just—after preaching about rights, violation of 
international law, or political equality. But could a real conversation take place? 
Would there be any movement in each other’s positions? If critique is not a mere 
deconstruction but always also a productive effort, must we not aim at such 
movements?  Perhaps, however, it was rather in the silence with the Palestinian 
driver that some movement became possible. Perhaps what we learnt from it, 
what we were forced to consider, is the emptiness of some political gestures. The 
paradoxes embedded into our political stance became very clear at that moment.  
Tel Aviv, 2014 
 
